It’s incredible how many stadiums and arenas were built around New York during that “first generation” of 1964-1984—and how quickly they were demolished.
Yankee Stadium II, Shea Stadium, Giants Stadium, the Brendan Byrne Arena, the Nassau Coliseum—nearly all gone and forgotten now, despite the roughly $384 million dollars in public money (over $2.1 billion in today’s money), expended on them.
(All have been demolished, save for the Nassau Coliseum, the home of minor-league basketball, and the Byrne Arena, now the Izod Center, home of television rehearsal stages. But we’re still paying them off!)
But it didn't end there. We kept going, of course—on to the second generation of publicly subsidized sports stadiums. Wealthfare for all!
Charlie Dolan never did get a (wholly new) Madison Square Garden. But George Steinbrenner got a third Yankee Stadium, the Mets got Citi Field, the Nets got Barclays Center, the Islanders, the UBS Arena.
It didn’t matter how many other needs there might be in places where these teams played. The city of Newark even paid out nearly $275 million to build the Prudential Center and bring in the Devils. Just what Newark needed—a hockey team!
Despite this immense “second round” of subsidies—now well into the billions—public authorities neither requested nor received any concessions over how local teams would run their businesses. Prices went up—and up—and ballparks started shrinking.
In 2008, the New York Yankees and the Mets drew a combined 8,340,700 fans—over 2.7 more than all three New York baseball teams had drawn at the height of their popularity, in the “Golden Age” year of 1947.
Barring some completely unforeseen change in, well, everything, their attendance will never reach approach these heights again.
Both the Mets and the Yankees made a deliberate decision to sacrifice affordable seats available to the general public, for more luxury boxes and other restricted, elite sections. Today, Yankee Stadium’s capacity has been reduced to just 46,537 for baseball, from its all-time high of 82,000 in 1927.
In other words, almost an entire Fenway Park’s equivalent of fans had been shut out of New York’s most popular ballpark.
What’s more, at all local, major-league sports facilities in the New York area, legal tender…is no longer legal tender. In a policy of dubious legality, the nine New York teams all insist on “cashless” transactions, which they depict as some sort of consumer-friendly service, instead of the exploitive effort to harvest fans’ data that it is.
For that matter, New York and New Jersey have made absolutely no effort to keep prices down on your screens away from the ballpark. Nor have our public officials ever challenged, in any way, pro sports’ new, noncompetitive arrangements, which have systematically erased the city’s market advantages.
While New York fans are charged prices higher than almost anywhere else on the continent, much of the money they provide is siphoned off to other cities and other teams, to ensure “competitive balance.”
Revenue sharing, luxury taxes, and salary caps leveled the playing field in all the big leagues—while individual teams were still allowed to move to new cities if they got a better offer. That is, teams were allowed to freely compete with each other…only in extorting cities for enormous payouts.
With pro sports cartels sharing and sharing alike, it is possible for teams to skip back and forth around the country, bidding up the publicly subsidies for their luxury-first stadiums. (Looking at you, Oakland-Los Angeles-Oakland-Las Vegas Raiders.
And yet because no league has built in spending “floors” to accompany its spending “ceilings,” owners are allowed the option of not really competing at all, but simply pocketing handouts from taxpayers in other cities—whether those taxpayers ever wish to see a game or not.
Over the last few decades, New York and many other big-city markets have allowed all their sports leverage to be wiped away—in exchange for nothing, and long after their economic vitality and wealth had been fully restored, making them more desirable than ever.
Even the expansion of local teams here in New York by over 100 percent from 1960 to-2007—from 4 to 9—has led to no decrease in prices, and no increased competition between teams.
Where once the city had marvelous, cutthroat rivalries between its ballclubs, now New York is a peaceable kingdom, with no owners or players much bestirred to beat even the other team(s) in town—much less win a championship.








