Congratulations! In a mere 112 MLB at-bats, you have officially achieved Joey Gallo 2.0 status.
Over Gallo's 10-season career, his batting average stood at .194. But let's ponder his salad years, Gallo's first seven in Texas, when he twice hit 40 HRs and made the all-star team. Over those seven years, he batted - gulp - .211.
Right now, you're hitting - gulp - .212.
Over his 10-year career, Gallo fanned 1,292 times - roughly 130 times per season. With the Rangers, in his halcyon years, he struck out 797 times - about 113 per season.
You're currently at 47, well on your way to beat him.
Gallo finished his career with 208 HRs. With Texas, he hit 145 - about 20 per season.
You have five - on your way to about 20.
And don't get me wrong. Your home runs are glorious. The ball springs off your bat, SpaceX trajectories, (and Fun Fact: The time it takes each ball to reach the upper decks corresponds exactly to the duration of the human male orgasm!) Your HRs make us believe. Trouble is, your strikeouts make us remember the horror show that was Gallo's final incarnation with the Yankees: a .159 batting average and 194 strikeouts - 48 percent of his ABs - over two years.
Unfortunately, this fan base all too well recalls Joey Gallo.
In fact, I doubt you'll reach seven years in NY without serious adjustments.
Sir, with all due respect, you must bunt! Gallo did it. It's part of the reason why he lasted 10 years. You must bunt - push the ball between the pitcher and 1B, and use your speed to beat the defense. Right now, you're wasting that speed. Bunt enough times, and you'll force opposing 1B to move in, creating defensive gaps. Learn to bunt, and you can maybe add 20 points to your BA.
Yesterday, in the 10th, with the tying run on second, you came to bat with one job: Advance the runner. The Braves didn't even bother to cover the chance of a bunt. Their 1B played back, daring you to lay one down. And you struck out swinging, uppercuts on balls high and inside, ridiculously unhittable. They never worried about a bunt. They knew you wouldn't. Or couldn't.
Hey, I'm not blaming you for the loss. It was a team effort. The Yankees fanned nine times, and these days, that's nothing. But you are here under a strikeout cloud, and when Cody Bellinger returns - which could be soon - your playing time is about to become zilch. You might even find yourself in Scranton with Anthony Volpe and Jasson Dominguez - the Big Three Former Yankees of the Apocalypse.
Sir, if you've got any bunts in that bat, it's time to show them. And if you don't know how to bunt, Scranton will be a great place for you to learn.
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27 comments:
When he hits the ball, good things tend to happen. I like that he gets singles, doubles, even a recent triple. But he has to make contact more often. Bunting? Sure. Most of the team should learn to bunt. If only the Scooter was here to give lessons.
Here's where analytics and AI have ruined baseball...
Baseball analytics dislikes the sacrifice bunt because data shows that voluntarily trading an out to advance a runner reduces a team’s overall run expectancy. Outs are the most precious and limited resource in an inning, and giving one away lowers the mathematical probability of scoring multiple runs.
The Math Behind Run Expectancy
Runner on first, no outs: The average team will score about 0.94 runs for the rest of that inning.
Runner on second, one out: After a successful sacrifice bunt, the expected runs drop to roughly 0.66 runs.
The Trade-Off: While a bunt slightly increases the chance of scoring at least one run, it drastically decreases the chances of scoring a big inning with multiple runs (via home runs, walks, or extra-base hits).
Why Analytics Favors Swinging Away
Outs are currency: Making an out is the single most damaging thing a hitter can do to stall an offense. Keeping all three outs alive yields more long-term value.
Maximizing damage: Modern data emphasizes slugging and high on-base percentages over "small ball" because home runs and extra-base hits create exponential scoring value.
The "Nobody Wins" Play: As analyst Bill James famously noted, a sacrifice bunt is a play where the defense is happy because they got an out, and the offense is happy they got a base—meaning the offense usually gave up too much value to get
The anal ytics prove that over 125 years of baseball was wrong. Just like with batting average. And level swings. And strikeouts. None of that matters. Except they all do, regardless of the numbers.
And this is also what is wrong with AI. Reality is not something you can project via math.
"Reality is not something you can project via math." +++++++1
Or perhaps the long explanation is that they aren't anywheres close to knowing all the variables in the equation. One day, maybe they can calculate what it takes to blow out a fart and get a win in extras. They don't have the know how, yet. Not even close.
You know what’s really a lot of fun to do? Ok - let me tell yah…
Comparing and contrasting Jones’ and Chisholm’s at bats.
It’s a blast.
And in addition - it’s a real treat to watch how Chisholm reacts after fu - er - messy up. Bad AB, horrendous throw to first, misplayed ball in the field . . . the man instantly plays the visual blame game. Like looking at his fingers and the palm of his hand yesterday after that awful “lollipop” of a throw as if there was a bone protruding out of it. Or visually dissecting his glove on an error or examining his bat for holes after a strike out.
Maybe Jazz should also go down to Scranton to learn that these issues are not due to equipment problems or BS physical issues. It has to do to BS problematic brain.
ranger, Do the analytics data show that a team that bunts is LESS likely to win a game like yesterday? Or do they merely show that bunting reduces overall run expectancy? Because these are two completely different things. For example, I would expect that a team that never, ever bunts will generate more total runs over the course of a season than the exact same team that bunts in those situations. But that doesn't mean that the team that never bunts would win more games. I would expect the team that bunts, in certain situations, to win more games. And then there is also the problem of differentiating between winning more games versus winning a game when it really counts. These are the problems, as I see it, with the analytics they use today.
I haven't been paying much attention to whether the Yankees are still using the torpedo bats. I think Wells was still using it, last I checked.
I look around baseball, and no one else is using that monstrosity. The other day, I saw that dude Meidroth on the White Sox reach out across the plate, hit a flare the other way down the right field line, for a two RBI bingle. That, I believe, would have been impossible, or at least far less likely, with a torpedo bat. That pitch must've been at least 6-8 inches off the outside corner, maybe more. Meidroth didn't do his exit velocity any favors with that hit. But you know what? He got the job done. That's the only thing that counts. Fuck analytics. Fuck exit velocity. Fuck torpedo bats.
(…Has to do with his BS problematic brain - or maybe his brain is just auto correcting typos like my phone is trying to force me into upgrading my hardware)
There's another thing that analytics has done to ruin baseball: the thing with batting your best hitter #2. I can't stop laughing at the stupidity of it.
Did anyone check out the national tv game last night on the peacock channel? ASS-stros at the Friars. The Choir Boys won, 7-2, in classic Yankee home run derby style. All of the runs in this game came via home runs.
ASS-stros had their best hitter, Yordan Alvarez, hitting #2. And you know what happened in the 9th? Alvarez came up as the last chance salooner! Yes, that's right, losing 7-2, he comes up in the 9th, with two outs, nobody on base!!!
WHOOOOOOOOOOOOOPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sorry, I know it ain't Aaron Judge, but just couldn't resist. Alvarez struck out swinging wildly, to boot.
Look, I would tend to agree that the #2 hitter thing probably maximizes total run production over the course of a season. But does it maximize the number of wins? Because those two things ain't the same thing. Then again, does it maximize your chances of winning any one particular game? Because once again, that's a completely different thing. No one gives a flying fuck whether you win a game 24-0 or 17-0. Nobody gives a flying fuck whether you have your best hitter coming up again for a 4th or 5th at bat if you're losing 7-2 in the 9th inning.
If fucking Ba-Boone had any spine power, he'd take all the guys that use the torpedo bats and have a sit down, convince them of the error of their ways. Take all those torpedo bats, drench them in lighter fluid, and have a Doors style funeral pyre party.
Ranger, those analytics most likely don't cover the situation with the ghost runner in extra innings. With a man already on second, the probability is much higher. At least to tie the game. Adding into the equation the next few batters' strikeout rates undoubtedly changes the numbers. I learned a lesson about AI last week. I had contractors come to my home to give quotes on redoing a shower. I looked up the approximate times for each step of the procedure. It listed the approximate time plus ballpark cost. When one contractor gave me a price higher than AI, he said, " AI is good for many things. But AI has never done the job, and so can't factor in the nuances and problems that often arise on the job."
Courtesy of The Animals, "Sky Pilot":
Cam Schlittler's the man
He throws ninety-nine
Cam will find courage
That the Yanks score in time
Trent Grisham will homer
To tie up the game
That's the best they can do
Cuz the offense is lame
(drums): doo-do doo-do doo-do doo-do
doo-do doo-do doo-do doo-do
Cammmmmmmmm Schlittler
(trumpets): baam baam baam ba-ba baaaammmm
Cammmmmmmmm Schlittler
One run's what you need
You'll never ever ever
Lose this game
Cammmmmmmmm Schlittler
(trumpets): baam baam baam ba-ba baaaammmm
Cammmmmmmmm Schlittler
One run's what you need
You'll never ever ever
Lose this game
+1 I've seen many extra inning games in the ghost runner era where the home team ties it up by advancing the runner to third, getting the run in, then pitching holds in the next inning, win it in the bottom of that inning
Playing Situational baseball beats analytics more often than not. In extra innings especially under current rules the final outcome is most often determined by one run. Moving the runner to third with one out is a terrific opportunity to score. In yesterday’s game, Jones didn’t even try to adjust his approach at the plate, instead using his usual long uppercut swing with the resultant failure. After the game, the team was blasé as usual…soon Jones, Dominguez, and Volpe will be together again at Scranton, which speaks volumes about the team’s player development, which should (but does not) include teaching the fundamentals of the game.
I think the talent the Yankees have pretty much compares with any of the best teams in baseball. Their approach is dead last, however. The lack of fundamentals, lack of understanding of how to win, that's all on the manager and coaching. The cavalier attitude towards everything. The "analytics based approach" to everything. The "we gave it our best shot, but it just didn't happen for us" kind of thing. No, you's guys ain't givin' it your best shot, you're doing almost everything back-ass-wards. I'd love to take a broom and whack 'em all over their heads with the dirty end.
Thirty or forty years from now, someone will write a book about how the current analytics crowd got everything backasswards. The new analytics in the future will reverse a lot of the stupidity that's going on right now. And they will say "wow, what a brilliant book, how come nobody thought of that back then". LOL
Maybe a bit of it could be due to equipment problems. Does Chisholm still use the torpedo bat? A regular bat will reduce bat speed but will help contact. Should reduce the strikeouts.
It's funny how analytics is about a statistical approach, but it conveniently ignores statistics in certain areas. This game has always been about percentages. Yet, the people who espouse analytics ignore the percentages when it comes to the #2 hitter strategy or batting averages or moving runners around in extra innings.
Analytics purports to be about statistics, but it's mostly a mis-use of statistics. Data analysis is a science because it's simple math. But, at the same time, there's a great deal of art involved in interpreting those numbers. You can use statistics to justify anything. It can be a valid argument or it can be total bullshit. Whenever someone throws stats at you, always think critically about what is behind that data.
There's a great, short, little illustrated book called "How to Lie With Statistics". I got it back when I was in college. Still have it and still reference it from time to time! And that's even though I studied statistics a bit me-self. I took an elective course in high school senior year, plus several statistics classes in college. That little book still gives you all the ways that statistics are manipulated to back up what someone wants you to believe. None of it is rocket science. As the Liberty insurance commercial says "it really is quite simple"!
I think the Torpedo Bat ruined Volpe...IMO...
I still can't get over the #2 batter strategy. (Please forgive me.) You're putting your best hitter in the #2 slot so that he comes up one more time at the end of the game? Sorry, but if that is the goal, he should be hitting #1, not #2. If he leads off, he'll come up even more times than if he bats #2. (There it is: analytics conveniently ignoring basic logic.)
Then there is the ultimate in mis-use of percentages. Don't you want your best hitter to come up in a meaningful situation? The 1st inning is always a meaningful situation. The last at-bat of a game may or may not be. As I've set forth numerous times, by batting your best hitter #2, you are guaranteeing that your best hitter will bat with nobody on base about 70% of the time in the 1st inning. That's in 113 out of 162 games, he will come up in the 1st inning with bases empty. Wow, just wow fucking wow!!!
And that was the tradeoff for (hopefully) coming up in the last at bat of a game in a meaningful situation. Against a closer who with electric stuff. Doesn't make any sense to me, but hey, that's what the analytics nerds want. What they want, that's what they get: yesterday in the ASS-stros-Friars affair, Yordan Alvarez comes up in the 9th, down by a 7-2 score, nobody on base. What a fucking joke!!!
+1 But he's too stupid to know it! He still uses it, right? I think so.
If you want it
Here it is
Come and get it
But you better hurry
Cause it's going fast
You better hurry
Cause it may not last
Long response:
Yes. I went back through the actual 10th inning, and this game is a very good example of the distinction you were making.
The Yankees did not bunt in the bottom of the 10th. The situation was:
Tie game, 1–1
Yankees at home
Automatic runner Jazz Chisholm Jr. on second
Spencer Jones led off
Braves brought in Tyler Kinley
Jones popped out
George Lombard Jr. grounded out
Ryan McMahon struck out
Yankees scored zero and lost 2–1.
So let's ask the question you actually care about:
Would bunting Jones have increased the Yankees' chance of winning?
I think there is a legitimate analytical argument that it would have.
And this is where I think conventional "run expectancy" analytics can give a misleading answer.
The standard argument against the bunt is:
Runner on second, nobody out is a very valuable offensive situation. Don't give away an out.
That's absolutely true if the objective is maximizing expected runs.
But that isn't quite the objective in the bottom of the 10th of a tied game.
The Yankees don't need three runs. They need one.
If Jones successfully bunts Chisholm to third, the Yankees have:
Runner on third, one out, tied game.
Now a relatively ordinary fly ball, ground ball, wild pitch, passed ball, infield hit, sacrifice fly, etc. can win the game.
And importantly, the Yankees then would have had Lombard and McMahon coming up. Lombard had a .400 OBP and .647 SLG entering the game, according to the box score, so he wasn't some automatic out.
Here's the really interesting part
There is actually a published study that examined this exact situation: tied extra-inning games, home team, automatic runner on second.
The researchers found that in 2021–22, teams that bunted their first batter in this situation went on to win 74% of the time, compared with 57% when they didn't bunt.
And after attempting to correct for the fact that better hitters were more likely not to bunt, their estimated effect still favored bunting: an odds ratio of 1.86.
That's extraordinarily relevant to your original question.
It means the evidence isn't merely:
"Bunting reduces run expectancy."
It's evidence suggesting:
"In this particular game state, bunting may actually increase the probability of winning the game."
Those are two completely different propositions.
And yesterday's game illustrates why
Look at what actually happened:
Jones swings → pop out.
Then:
Lombard → groundout.
Then:
McMahon → strikeout.
Game over.
Had Jones bunted successfully, you would instead have had:
Chisholm on third, one out, Lombard batting.
That's a very different baseball problem.
And there's another subtle point: Jones was probably a much more logical bunt candidate than a generic "Yankees hitter." He entered the game hitting only .212/.301/.390. Lombard, by contrast, was hitting .294/.400/.647.
So if the Yankees' decision was based on the general principle "never give away an out because run expectancy says don't," I think that's precisely the kind of situation where your criticism of the analytics has merit.
But I wouldn't say the analytics prove Boone was wrong
There's an important caveat.
The 74% vs. 57% study is observational data, not a randomized experiment. The researchers themselves acknowledge that the decision to bunt is related to the type of hitter involved, which is why they used statistical adjustment.
And we can't look at yesterday's result and say, "See! They should have bunted." That's outcome bias.
The right question is what the probability was before Jones's plate appearance.
But that's precisely why I think your original formulation is so good.
There are really three different questions
1. Does bunting reduce expected runs?
Usually, yes.
2. Does bunting reduce the probability of winning?
Not necessarily. In fact, in the very specific ghost-runner situation, the available research suggests it may increase it.
3. Does bunting increase the probability of winning this particular game?
That's the question that should have been asked yesterday.
And there's one more distinction you raised that I think is extremely important:
Winning more games isn't necessarily the same as maximizing the probability of winning a particular high-leverage game.
A strategy can be inferior over 162 games in terms of total runs and still be the superior strategy when the game is tied in the bottom of the 10th.
That's why I wouldn't dismiss your argument as "old-school baseball thinking." You're actually asking whether the objective function being optimized by the analytics is the right one.
And in yesterday's specific situation, there is serious statistical evidence that the answer may have been "bunt."
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